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claimant asserting a monetary claim
to obtain a person's consumer report
without violating the FCRA.
Rejecting this assertion, the court
explained that a monetary claim is
distinguishable from collecting a
debt because the latter involves a
credit transaction.
Third, Korotki argued that ASC
could have obtained the additional
address at which to serve Korotki by
running a less intrusive credit check.
Again, the court rejected this
argument, noting that the FCRA
does not limit an authorized user's

access to credit information.
Finally, the court rejected
Korotki's argument that the acquisition of his credit report was frivolous because the notice period for
the mechanics lien had expired. The
court held that Schmitt acted
reasonably in his client's interest and
that Korotki failed to present any
evidence of bad faith.
In addition to his claim under the
FCRA, Korotki brought state law
claims pursuant to the CCRAA and
common law invasion of privacy.
With respect to Korotki's CCRAA

claims, the court found that the
FCRA and the CCRAA are virtually
identical. Thus, given the court's
dismissal of the FCRA claim, the
court concluded that the defendants
did not violate the CCRAA either.
Finally, with respect to Korotki's
claim of invasion of privacy, the
court held that because the FCRA
authorized the defendants' actions, a
finding of an invasion of privacy
would be inconsistent with the
FCRA, and thus, preempted by the
FCRA.

Batch code obliteration violates trademark and
unfair competition laws by causing "likelihood of
consumer confusion"
by CatherineMoore
In John PaulMitchell Systems v. Pete-N-Larry's
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), the Federal
District Court for the Western District of New York
found that a retailer's obliteration of batch codes from
bottles of hair care products resulted in consumer
confusion sufficient to constitute a potential violation of
the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 and New York's
unfair competition laws.

Hair care products sold without
authorization
John Paul Mitchell Systems ("JPMS"), the manufacturer of the Paul Mitchell line of hair care products,
authorizes the distribution of its products exclusively to
professional hair salons and stylists. JPMS limits
product availability to ensure that consumers have the
opportunity to seek professional advice for questions
concerning the appropriate selection and proper usage of
Paul Mitchell products. JPMS maintains that the quality
of its product suffers if consumers do not have access to
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professional consultations. Consequently, JPMS does
not authorize the sale or distribution of Paul Mitchell
products to retail stores.
The defendants, Pete-N-Larry's Inc. and several other
retail stores, admitted that they sold Paul Mitchell
products without authorization. The plaintiffs, JPMS and
its regional distributor, alleged that the defendant
retailers wrongfully obtained the products and physically obliterated the batch codes from the bottles "in
concert with numerous, diverse, and unknown others."
Batch codes are required by federal and state laws and
are necessary to identify specific products in the event of
a product recall. JPMS contractually prohibits its
authorized distributors from selling Paul Mitchell
products "to any person they know or have reason to
suspect intends to sell the product to someone else."
JPMS further alleged that the defendant retailers
denied access to professional consults to those consumers who purchased Paul Mitchell products. Additionally,
JPMS contended that the defendant retailers failed to
make such consumers the "conspicuously" aware that
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JPMS does not guarantee Paul Mitchell products
marketed by unauthorized sellers.
JPMS claimed that the retailers' unauthorized sale of
Paul Mitchell products constituted: (1) violations of the
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. ("the
Lanham Act"); (2) exposure to potential civil and
criminal liability that also violated the Lanham Act; (3)
unfair competition under New York law; (4) tortious
interference with contracts; and (5) fraud. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.

Damaged packaging creates consumer
confusion
JPMS asserted that the defendants violated two
provisions of the Lanham Act - § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1), for trademark infringement, and § 43(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a), for false designation of origin or
affiliation. In response, the defendant retailers argued
that they could not have committed any trademark
violations because they sold authentic JPMS products.
The court determined that JPMS stated a claim under
either Lanham Act provision provided that JPMS could
prove consumer confusion as to the source of the
products.
Courts have established two basic approaches for
deciding whether goods that allegedly infringe a
manufacturer's trademark violate the Lanham Act.
Under the first approach, a material difference between
the manufacturer's good and the alleged infringing good
creates a presumption of consumer confusion. Under the
second approach, the possibility of consumer confusion
is not even considered if the alleged infringing good is a
"genuine" product of the manufacturer.
In the present case, the court recognized that finding
something to be "materially different" follows along the
same lines as finding it not to be "genuine:' However,
the court explained that the two approaches are distinct
and open to separate interpretations. The court reviewed
several infringement cases in order to analyze past
utilization of both approaches. These cases defined
materiality and genuineness in a variety of ways. Since
the court was considering summary judgment here, the
court based its decision on the definitions most favorable to JPMS.
The court examined the First Circuit's approach in
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Societe Des ProduitsNestle v. CasaHelvetia, 982 F.2d
633 (1st Cir. 1992), in considering whether a material
difference existed between the goods authorized for sale
by JPMS and the goods sold by the defendant retailers.
In Nestle, the First Circuit defined a "material difference" as any discrepancy that impairs the ability of
consumers to make informed purchases. Thus, minor
changes made to products or packages are material
differences because "it is by subtle differences that
consumers are most easily confused?' The Nestle court
held that a "material difference" between the
manufacturer's goods and the alleged infringing goods is
the "linchpin" of liability under either § 32(1) or § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.
In the present case, the court also examined the
analysis employed by the Fourth Circuit in Shell Oil Co.
v. CommercialPetroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.
1991). The court in Shell Oil determined that authentic
products are not necessarily genuine products. Although
courts reached similar conclusions in other infringement
cases, Shell Oil focused on product "genuineness" as a
threshold question. Under the Shell Oil framework, a
finding that a product is not genuine results in a possibility of consumer confusion. The Shell Oil court held that
a product is not "genuine" unless it is "distributed under
quality controls established by the manufacturer." In
light of these definitions, the court in the present case
found that summary judgment was not warranted under
either the materiality or genuineness approach, assuming
JPMS's allegations were true.
The physical changes made to the Paul Mitchell
packaging influenced the court's decision more than the
manner in which the retailers sold the products. For
example, the court stated that it doubted whether the
retailers' failure to offer professional consultations,
standing alone, would amount to a material difference
between the authorized JPMS product and that sold by
the defendant retailers. However, the court found that
the failure to offer professional consultations, combined
with the eradication of batch codes, created a material
difference likely to confuse consumers.
The court stated that the obliteration of the batch
codes, which scarred the bottle and in many cases also
erased some of the information written on it, interfered
with JPMS's ability to control its product quality.
Specifically, the court mentioned that one bottle had
been punctured. In addition, the court found that the
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missing batch codes made it difficult to recall defective
products. Although JPMS had never actually recalled
any product, the court did not diminish the potential role
of the batch codes in quality control. Accordingly, the
court held that the products sold by the defendant
retailers were, as a matter of law, materially different
from JPMS products because the bottles had been
substantially altered. Similarly, the court found that the
crude removal of the batch codes resulted in a product
that was not "genuine" under the Shell Oil analysis.

claims were closely related because a likelihood of
consumer confusion constitutes unfair competition under
New York law. JPMS had already established that
changes made to its product were likely to confuse
consumers when it argued the first Lanham Act claim.
Therefore, the court considered it unnecessary to
reexamine the merits of those arguments in ruling on the
unfair competition claim. Accordingly, the court denied
the retailers' motion to dismiss and motion for summary
judgment as to the unfair competition claim.

Consumer confusion violated more than
the Lanham Act

Insufficient evidence for breach of
contract and fraud

The Lanham Act also formed the basis for the second
claim. The court dismissed this claim not because it
lacked merit, but rather because the court found it
repetitious of the first Lanham Act claim. JPMS asserted
that the batch code removal also erased the dates of
manufacture. New York's Department of Environmental
Conservation's Consumer and Commercial Products
regulations, 6 N.Y.C.R.R. part 235, require all hairsprays
sold in New York to be either marked or coded with a
manufacture date. JPMS argued that consumers knew
about this requirement and attributed the lack of a
manufacture date to JPMS. As a result, JPMS claimed
that the defendant retailers created a likelihood of
consumer confusion which violated the Lanham Act by
exposing JPMS to liability under the New York regulations.
Although the court noted that the possibility existed
that JPMS could prove the violation, it dismissed the
second Lanham Act claim because it involved the same
statute, factual allegations, and theory of liability as the
first Lanham Act claim. The court found that the second
claim was not unique and concluded that it merely
duplicated the first claim.
Similarly, the unfair competition claim closely
paralleled the second Lanham Act claim. This claim also
alleged that the defendant retailers exposed JPMS to
liability by removing the manufacture dates. However,
instead of alleging a Lanham Act violation, this claim
alleged a violation of New York's unfair competition
law.
The court found the unfair competition claim to be
independent of the first Lanham Act claim because it
was based on different law. Although distinct, the two

The court dismissed the tortious interference claim
because it found at least one of the requirements for
tortious interference with contract lacking. The requirements include (1) the existence of a valid contract
between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the
defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) the
defendant's intentional procuring of the breach by the
third party; (4) and damages to the plaintiff resulting
from the breach.
The court found that JPMS did not prove that the
defendant retailers procured the breach of any distribution contracts. The retailers submitted affidavits stating
that they purchased the products from unauthorized
sellers and that they never had any contact with authorized distributors or sellers. JPMS argued that even if the
retailers did not directly procure a breach, they indirectly
did so by purchasing Paul Mitchell products despite
knowledge of JPMS's exclusive distribution network.
However, the court proved reluctant to assign culpability
to a party not directly involved in procuring a breach
and found that the retailers could not be held liable for a
breach essentially procured by another party. Consequently, the court dismissed the tortious interference
claim.
Similarly, the court dismissed the fraud claim because
JPMS failed to establish each required element of fraud.
The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation; (2)
concealment or non-disclosure of a material fact; (3) the
defendant's intent to deceive; (4) justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation by the plaintiff; and (5)
injury to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.
JPMS claimed that the removal of the batch codes
constituted concealment because this act prevented
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identification of the authorized sellers who breached
their distribution contracts. The retailers responded by
submitting affidavits stating that they did not obliterate
the batch codes from any JPMS products. JPMS argued
that even if the retailers were not responsible for the
obliteration, they knew that this action precluded JPMS
from tracing the product to those parties responsible for
the illicit distribution. However, the court held that the
defendant retailers had no duty to disclose the missing
batch codes to JPMS. As a result, the court held that
JPMS presented insufficient evidence to prove concealment by the retailers. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the fraud claim.

Conclusion
The court denied in part and granted in part the
retailers motions for summary judgment and dismissal.

The court found that the obliteration of the batch codes
resulted in Paul Mitchell products materially different
from JPMS authorized products. This caused a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the origin of the
Paul Mitchell products sold by the retailers. The court,
therefore, denied summary judgment and dismissal on
the first Lanham Act claim and the unfair competition
claim. The court dismissed the second claim, but only
because this claim proved too similar to the Lanham Act
claim to form an independent claim. The defendant
retailers were not the only ones involved in taking Paul
Mitchell products out of the JPMS distribution network.
Thus, JPMS could not establish that the defendant
retailers instigated the unauthorized distribution or that
they obliterated the batch codes. The court was unwilling to hold the retailers liable for mere awareness of
such activities. Consequently, the court dismissed the
tortious interference and fraud claims.

The statute of limitations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act is strictly construed
by LindaA. Kerns
Consumers seeking to file a claim
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA") must strictly adhere to the
statute of limitations unless their
claim meets a narrowly construed
discovery exception. In Clark v.
State FarmFire & Casualty
InsuranceCo., 54 E3d 669 (10th
Cir. 1995), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding
that a "general discovery exception"
to the statute of limitations would be
contrary to Congress' express
intention. To ensure a consumer's
privacy, the FCRA provides limited
circumstances where credit reports
may be furnished and specified
instances where consumers must be
notified if their credit report is
issued. The statute of limitations
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under the FCRA will only be
extended if a credit report is issued,
is required to be disclosed to the
consumer, and contains a willful and
material misrepresentation.

Credit report obtained
without consumer's
consent
The plaintiffs, Robert and Billie
Clark ("the Clarks"), filed an action
against State Farm Fire & Casualty
Insurance Company ("State Farm")
seeking actual and punitive damages. The Clarks alleged that State
Farm violated the FCRA when it
obtained the Clarks' credit report
without their consent on July 25,
1989. State Farm procured the report
in connection with a separate

investigation which involved the
alleged destruction by arson of a
piece of property that the Clarks had
sold to a third party.

Narrow exception in
statute may extend tolling
period
The Clarks filed their complaint
on April 6, 1992, two years and
eight months after the credit report
was issued. State Farm filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that the
statute of limitations had run. The
FCRA requires that an action be
brought within two years from the
date on which the liability arises.
However, a claim may be brought at
any time within two years after the
consumer discovers the report if the
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